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Abstract—This paper presents a method that in real-time
determines remedial actions, which restore stable operation with
respect to aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability (ASSRAS)
when insecure or unstable operation has been detected. An
ASSRAS assessment method is used to monitor the stability
boundary for each generator in real-time. The ASSRAS boundary
represents the condition when a generator reaches the maximum
steady state active power injection. The proposed control method
exploits analytically derived expressions for the ASSRAS bound-
ary and other characteristic curves in the injection impedance
plane to determine an active power redispatch among selected
generators to restore stable and secure operation. Since the
method is purely based on analytically derived expression, the
computation of the remedial actions is fast and well suited for
real-time operation. The method was tested on the IEEE 14-bus
and the Nordic32 test systems where results show that the method
can efficiently determine the required active power redispatch to
avoid an imminent instability.
Index Terms—power system stability, power system control,
power system generation redispatch, remedial action schemes
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN societies are highly dependent on a stable andsecure operation of the power system. A continuously
increasing share of power production based on renewable
energy sources (RES) can be observed in numerous countries,
where e.g. in Denmark the government’s energy strategy states
that 50 % of the electricity consumption is to be supplied by
wind power by 2020 [1]. The foreseen challenges associated
with these goals are great as the future power system has to be
securely operated and delivering energy at competitive prices.
The fluctuating nature of RES such as wind and solar radi-
ation may cause rapid changes in future generation patterns,
leading to rapid fluctuations of the power system’s operating
point. Existing offline and computationally demanding ap-
proaches for assessing stability and determination of remedial
or preventive actions may become insufficient. Hence, a need
for real-time approaches will arise for the future system [2].
Efforts have been made to meet the real-time requirements
for the assessment of the future system. A method for online
assessment of voltage stability is presented in [3], [4]. The
method does not rely on a dynamic model to predict the
system response, instead basic assumptions and simplifications
are applied in the modeling process resulting in reduced
computational burden. In [5] an element wise approach is
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proposed for stability assessment where each individual assess-
ment method analyzes a particular instability mechanism. [5]
describes such a method to monitor the aperiodic small signal
rotor angle stability (ASSRAS) of the individual generators
and to determine their respective stability margin. This stability
mechanism refers to the ability of each individual generator to
produce sufficient steady state electromechanical torque. If this
torque balance is upset, an aperiodic increase in rotor angle
and a subsequent loss of synchronism can be observed.
The authors of [6] emphasize that efficient remedial action
schemes (RAS) are an enabler for connecting more RES based
generation. The real-world implementation of a Centralized
Remedial Action Scheme (CRAS) system was described in
[6]. The system executes corrective actions such as load
or generation reduction to ensure reliable and safe system
operation after fault occurrence. The automatic system-wide
RAS arming system currently used in the power grid of
British Columbia was described in [7]. The RAS arming
patterns are determined periodically employing a transient
stability analysis tool, which ensures security of the system.
To achieve real-time performance, the system relies on a large
case database build from extensive off-line planning studies.
A new methodology for determining the security region for
operation of transmission systems is described in [8]. The
calculation of the boundaries is done offline and can be used
to identify efficient controls and remedial actions. The authors
of [9] propose an adaptive damping control scheme, which
uses online measurements to adapt the controller parameters to
changing operating conditions. The initial parameters are de-
termined offline using a set of nominal operating conditions. In
[10] the authors compare two different approaches for damping
inter-area oscillations and come to the conclusion that wide-
area control methods are more effective than local controls.
The previous two paper determine controls for periodic small
signal rotor angle stability, while the following method and
the one proposed in this paper address ASSRAS.
In [11] the authors developed a method, which determines
the necessary countermeasures to be applied to a number of
loads to restore stability and security of the system with respect
to the ASSRAS boundary. The method therefore alters the
consumption pattern of load buses, which were identified to
be the most effective locations for applying countermeasures.
This paper presents a new method to restore ASSRAS for
which a patent has been submitted [12]. The investigated
instability mechanism is a quasi steady state phenomena.
Consequently, the assessment method as well as the developed
remedial action method require that the system is in quasi
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Fig. 1. In [13] for this two bus system critical and characteristic curves were
expressed in terms of the injection impedance
steady state. Most of the prior mentioned methods rely on
extensive offline studies to determine the corrective control
actions. In contrast to that, the proposed method is derived
analytically and only requires online measurements of the
current system condition. With these information, the method
can fast and accurately determine the required control actions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the
ASSRAS assessment method is briefly described. The data
provided by the assessment method are utilized in the de-
veloped remedial action method to compute corrective active
power redispatch solutions, which is described in Sec. III. The
method’s capability to avoid an imminent collapse in voltage is
presented in Sec. IV, where the results from two test systems
are presented. Finally, in Sec. V the presented method and
results are discussed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Algebraic Expressions for Critical Transmission Limits
Reference [13] describes the mapping of some characteristic
curves from a PQV-surface of a two bus system into the
injection impedance plane (see Fig. 1). For such a system the
relationship of the voltage magnitudes in both ends (E and
V ) and the active & reactive power (P and Q) becomes:
V 4+V 2(2(RP+XQ)−E2)+(R2+X2)(P 2+Q2) = 0 (1)
where R and X are the resistance and reactance of the line. In
[13] it is shown, by manipulation of (1), that the condition for
maximum deliverable power to the receiving end, under the
assumption of constant E and V , is represented by a circle in
the injection impedance plane, which is in polar coordinates:
Zinj = −ZLN sin(θ)/ sinφ (2)
Here, Zinj 6 θ represents the complex injection impedance and
ZLN 6 φ the impedance of the line where ZLN =
√
R2 +X2.
Furthermore in [13], it was shown that lines of constant voltage
magnitude V and voltage angle δ (the angle between E and V )
map as circles in the injection impedance plane. For later use
the equations describing these characteristic curves are stated
at this point. The curves of constant voltage magnitude satisfy:
Zinj = r0 · cos(θ − ϕ)±
√









V 2−E2 ; tanϕ =
−X
−R
From [13], the curve for constant voltage angle δ is given by:
Zinj = −(ZLN/ sin δ) · sin(δ + φ− θ) (4)
B. Method for Real-Time Assessment of ASSRAS
In [5] a method is presented to quickly assess the ASS-
RAS of all system generators. In Fig. 2, a block diagram
of the employed method is shown to visualize the different
steps carried out to assess stability. The algebraically derived
expression for maximum injection of active power in (2) is
exploited to formulate an algebraic assessment criterion which
enables stability assessment in linear time [14]. The ASSRAS
boundary of a generator is given by:
Zinj,i = −(Zth,i sin(θ))/(sinφth,i) (5)
where Zinj,i 6 θ = Zinj,i is the complex injection
impedance seen from the ith generator’s node of constant
steady state voltage magnitude and Zth,i 6 φth,i is the complex
The´venin network impedance seen from the same node. In
[15] it was shown that the The´venin equivalent parameters
seen from each generator can be directly computed from
the network admittance matrix and a system snapshot. The
authors of [14] presented a test case with 7917 buses and 1325
voltage control nodes and demonstrated that all the The´venin
equivalent parameters could be computed within 2.5 ms.
Eq. (5) appears as a circle in the injection impedance plane
and the generator’s ASSRAS is determined from its value of
Zinj,i. A value of Zinj,i outside the circle represents stable
operation while a value inside represents unstable operation.
An unstable operation is characterized by the condition when
a small increase of the steady state rotor angle δ of a given
generator reduces its active power output. While during stable
operation, an increase in δ increases the generator’s active
power output. The assessment method determines whether a
steady state equilibrium point exists between the mechanical
power applied to a given generator and its active power output.
If a disturbance causes a loss of the generator’s steady state
equilibrium point, the generator will begin to lose synchronism
in a process that may take 10’s of seconds and up to a few
minutes to evolve [5] [15]. In order to track the stability
condition of a generator in real-time, system snapshots need
to be available at a sampling rate equivalent to the repetition
rate of measurements provided by PMUs or from a fast
state estimator. The sampling rate of the snapshots should be
sufficient to trace the movement of the operating points and a
higher rate allows to choose lower security limits.
As the cause of aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability
is the lack of existence of an equilibrium point between the
mechanical and electrical power of a given generator, an
intuitive choice of a counter action is to lower mechanical
power applied to the critical machine to restore an equilibrium.
Stability Margin In [5] the authors showed that the distance
of the operating point (OP) of a generator to the stability
boundary is a measure of the distance to instability and that
it can be expressed in terms of various variables. When
representing a generator by a voltage source V 6 δ and the
remaining grid by a Thevenin equivalent corresponding to
a voltage source with magnitude Eth and an impedance
Zth 6 φth, then its power injection Pinj is:
Pinj = (EthV/Zth) cos(δ + φth)− (V 2/Zth) cos(φth) (6)







From snapshot update admittance
matrix and determine Zth seen
from each generator (see [14])
Determine stability (5)
[5] and stability margin






















Fig. 3. Function blocks of the proposed remedial action method
Under the assumption of constant voltage magnitudes at nodes
of power injection and freezing of all other phase angles, the
power injection of a particular generator becomes a function
of solely the phase angle δ and is maximal at the angle
δ = 180◦ − φth, which represents the ASSRAS boundary.
Consequently, the maximum power injection Pˆinj can be
expressed as:
Pˆinj = −EthV/Zth − (V 2/Zth) cos(φth) (7)
This allows to define a stability margin in percentage of the
maximum power injection %∆Pinj .
%∆Pinj =
cos(δ + φth) + 1
1 + VEth cosφth
· 100% (8)
C. Relative electrical distance
In [16], the authors describe an approach to determine the
relative electrical distance between load buses and generator
buses. For that purpose the authors utilize the network admit-













where the complex current and voltage vectors at the generator
and load buses are represented by IG, IL, VG and VL. The
sub-matrices YGG, YGL, YLG and YLL are the correspond-
ing parts of the network admittance matrix.
The authors showed that the sub-matrices can be used to
determine the relative electrical distance of the load buses to
the generator buses in the system, which can be computed as
follows.
[RLG] = 1− abs[FLG] = 1− abs([YLL]−1[YLG]) (10)
The values in each column of the resulting matrix contain a
measure of the relative electrical distance between a load bus
and the respective generator.
III. METHOD FOR REAL-TIME DETERMINATION OF
REMEDIAL ACTIONS
This section describes a method capable of determining a
generator redispatch solution to circumvent ASSRA instability
in real-time. Figure 3 shows the function blocks of the
proposed method.
A. Trigger and security margins
It is preferable that the remedial actions are executed before
the system becomes unstable. Hence, a trigger margin is
introduced that corresponds to a percentage of the maximum
power injection and represents the stability margin threshold
below which the remedial action method is executed. To find a
new set point and to limit how much the remaining generators
can contribute to the remedial action, a second threshold is
introduced, called security margin msec, which defines the
security boundary. In this approach, it was assumed that the
voltage at the node of power injection remains constant during
the remedial action. This assumption is valid, because the
node of power injection is chosen to be at the terminal of
the generator or behind the synchronous reactance depending
on the respective excitation system of the generator. Due to
the constant voltage magnitude the power injection of the
generator is solely determined by its voltage angle, see (6).
Consequently, the curve corresponding to the trigger and the
security margin are represented by a curve of constant voltage






Fig. 4. Injection impedance plane displaying the aperiodic small signal rotor
angle stability boundary (solid circle), the security boundary (dashed circle)
and the circle corresponding to the trigger margin (dotted circle)
The selection of appropriate margin thresholds is a trade-
off between level of system security and additional con-
straints on the generator’s capacity. Since the requirement of
a greater margin directly affects the maximum power that a
generator can provide to the system and, hence, may lead to
an economical loss. Therefore, a balance between required
margins for secure system operation and economically efficient
operation of the generators has to be found. The margins
may be different in each individual power system and it is
suggested that the system operators choose them based on their
experience and from offline studies of a selection of aperiodic
small signal rotor angle stable and unstable contingencies.
4The assessment method analyses the ASSRAS of the system
during quasi steady state conditions. However, a crossing of
the stability boundary is acceptable in dynamic transition
periods from one to another steady state equilibrium point.
Consequently, the remedial action method should only be
executed, when the system is in quasi steady state and the
generators stability margin has fallen below the trigger margin.
B. Quasi steady state and error estimation
Since the method is based on the assumption of constant
voltage magnitude at the nodes of power injection, the voltage
magnitudes at these nodes can be used to determine the
steadiness of the system. It is assumed that the system is
in quasi steady state, when the maximum power injection
at a node of constant voltage magnitude can be determined
with satisfactory accuracy. Therefore, at a node with assumed
constant voltage magnitude the measured voltage magnitudes
provided by a PMU are stored for a certain period. Under
the assumption that the Thevenin voltage has constant voltage
magnitude, the maximum power injection at the node can be
computed as a function of the measured voltage magnitudes
V (tn) using (7). When extracting the maximum Vmax and
minimum Vmin of the voltage magnitude in the period of
concern, the corresponding maximum error of the computed





In this paper the acceptable error was chosen to be 0.5 %.
C. N-1 operating point
The discussed assessment method assumes either the voltage
magnitude at the terminal of the machine to be constant or
at the internal node behind the synchronous reactance Xs. If
saliency is neglected, Xs is equal to the reactance in the d-
axis Xd and q-axis Xq . Hence, under the assumption that the
complex voltage E¯t and the complex current I¯t at the terminal
of the machine are monitored, then the internal voltage E¯q can
be computed as follows.
E¯q = E¯t + jXdI¯t (12)
For a salient machine the assumption of constant voltage
behind Xd introduces an error, which was investigated in
[15]. The results showed that the assumption leads to very
small deviations and slightly more conservative assessment
results. A machine equipped with an automatic voltage regu-
lator (AVR) will keep the voltage magnitude at the terminal
constant, unless the excitation exceeds its limit and the over
excitation limiter (OEL) is activated. The activation will cause
that the field current is kept constant at a limit value and,
hence, the voltage at the terminal can no longer be assumed
constant. However, under such conditions the voltage magni-
tude at the internal node behind Xd can be assumed constant.
During AVR operation with constant voltage magnitude at the
terminal, the stability of the N−1 OP, which assumes constant
voltage magnitude at the internal node, can be monitored
simultaneously with the actual OP. This allows to provide
information on the stability condition of the system in case
of activation of an OEL of a machine. Furthermore, it allows
to determine control actions guaranteeing secure operation
in case of activation of an OEL. If remedial actions are
considered for N − 1 OPs, the trigger and security margins
may be chosen lower than for actual OPs, since a stability
boundary crossing of a N − 1 OP only corresponds to an
insecure, but not unstable situation.
D. Assumption of constant voltage magnitude
In this section it is described at which node the voltage
magnitude is assumed to be constant during the remedial
action. Table I shows where the voltage magnitude is assumed
to be constant depending on the generator’s excitation system,
the state of the OEL and the type of the OP, whose stability
margin fell below the trigger margin or rather is imminent to
experiencing instability.
TABLE I
LOCATION OF NODE OF CONSTANT VOLTAGE MAGNITUDE DURING
REMEDIAL ACTION IN DIFFERENT GENERATOR CONFIGURATION AND
OPERATION CONDITIONS
Excitation system OEL Actual OP N − 1 OP
Manually – behind Xd –
AVR with OEL inactive at terminal at terminalactive behind Xd -
In the simple case that the machine is manually excited, the
voltage magnitude is assumed to be constant behind Xd and
may be computed with (12). In the more complex case, where
the machine is equipped with an AVR the location of the node
of constant voltage during the remedial action is dependent on
the state of the OEL. If the OEL is inactive and, hence, the
AVR keeps the voltage magnitude at the machine terminal
constant, then the voltage magnitude during the remedial
action is assumed to be constant at the terminal independent on
the type of OP that is imminent unstable/insecure. If the OEL
is activated, the node of constant voltage magnitude moves
behind Xd and, consequently, this is also the node, where the
voltage magnitude is assumed to be constant throughout the
control action.
E. Computation of new stable and secure operating point
1) Imminent unstable node is actual operating point: In the
case that the margin of the actual OP of a generator fell below
the trigger margin, the power output of the generator has to
be reduced to move the OP back into the region of secure
operation. Since the desired security margin msec is known as
a percentage of the maximum power injection and under the
assumption that the voltage magnitude ratio V/Eth remains
constant throughout the remedial action, (8) can be used to














Subsequently, with the new voltage angle δ∗, the new active
power injection at the secure OP can be determined utilizing
(6). Then the necessary power reduction can be determined as
the difference between power injection at the current voltage
angle δ and the new secure voltage angle δ∗. Figure 5 depicts
the determination of the new secure OP in the injection
impedance plane.












Fig. 5. Graphical representation of the computation of a new secure operating
point for the case of imminent instability due to an actual operating point
The injection impedance Zinj (blue dot) of the respective
generator crossed the trigger boundary, which executed the
method. Following, the new angle δ∗ was computed using
(13). The new injection impedance Z∗inj of the generator is
then found by determining the intersection of the curve of
constant voltage magnitude and the line of constant voltage
angle corresponding to δ∗.
2) Imminent unstable node is N-1 operating point: In order
to operate the system in a secure manner, it is desirable
that the N − 1 OP of a machine is also in the stable and
secure operating region. The computation of the needed power
reduction differs from the calculations in Sec. III-E1, since
the voltage magnitude at the internal node, which is used to
compute the N − 1 OP, cannot be assumed to be constant
throughout the process. It is assumed that also in this case
the AVR of the generator keeps the voltage magnitude at the
terminal constant and, hence, the corresponding characteristic
curve of constant voltage magnitude can be utilized.
In the injection impedance plane, the distance between
the injection impedance of the N − 1 OP and the injection
impedance of the actual OP is purely imaginary and equal to
Xd. This allows to map characteristic curves of the actual to
the N − 1 OP (see Fig. 6).
The new secure OP of the N − 1 OP can be found as the
intersection of the circle representing the security boundary
of the N − 1 OP with the circle corresponding to the curve
of constant voltage magnitude of the actual operating point
mapped to the N − 1 OP (see Fig. 6).
The equation for curves of constant voltage magnitude as
described in (3) can be rewritten as:
Zinj,const.|V | = r0 · ejφth + r · ejθ (14)
where r is the radius of the circle, the distance from the origin
to the centre of the circle is r0 and the angle between real axis
and a line through the origin and centre of the circle is φth.
This circle of constant voltage magnitude can be mapped to
the N − 1 OP by subtracting jXd.
Zinj,const.|V |,T = r0 · ejφth + r · ejθ − jXd (15)
Curves of constant voltage angle in the injection impedance
are described by (4) and this shows that all the circles of
constant voltage angle intercept the origin. Consequently, the
term in front of the sine corresponds to the diameter of the
circle. This allows to determine the radius of the circle as well
as the angle between real axis and the line through origin
and centre of the circle. The equation can be rewritten and
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Fig. 6. Graphical representation of the computation of a new secure operating








Knowing the desired stability margin msec and after compu-
tation of the current voltage magnitude at the internal node
of the machine, the new secure voltage angle of the N − 1
OP can be determined utilizing (13). Subsequently, the circle
corresponding to the curve of constant voltage angle can be
computed using (16). The intersection of the circle of constant
voltage angle described by (16) and the mapped circle of
constant voltage magnitude of the actual OP described by
(15) gives the new secure N − 1 OP in terms of the injection
impedance Z∗inj,N−1. The corresponding new actual OP can be
computed from the new actual injection impedance Z∗inj,act,
which can be computed by adding the synchronous reactance
to Z∗inj,N−1 (see Fig. 6). Since the voltage magnitude in
the actual OP was assumed to be constant, the active power
injection in the new and secure OP can be computed and the
necessary active power reduction can be determined.
F. Computation of available power reserves
After the required power reduction was calculated the avail-
able power resources of the remaining generators have to be
determined to eventually propose a power redispatch solution.
The available resources are calculated, while respecting the
following constraints. The ”new” power injection should not
• exceed the Pˆinj plus the respective security margin
• exceed nominal power of the generator plus a sec. margin
• move the corresponding N − 1 OP into an insecure or
unstable position. Hence, also for the N−1 OP a security
margin should be maintained.
The power reserve with respect to the nominal power of
the generator can directly be computed knowing the security
margin and the machine parameter.
In the following, the power reserve computation for an
actual OP and for an actual OP with respect to its N − 1
OP are presented.
1) Power reserve of an actual operating point: The avail-
able power reserve ∆Pinj,res of a generator with respect to
its maximum power injection can simply be computed from
the difference between the current stability margin %∆Pinj
6(8) and the pre-determined security margin msec, since both
are expressed as percentages of Pˆinj (7).
∆Pinj,res = (%∆Pinj −msec)/100% · Pinj,max (17)
2) Power reserve of an actual operating point with respect
to corresponding N-1 operating point: In order to compute
the power reserve an approach similar to the one in section
III-E2 was taken. For that purpose the characteristic curves














Stability boundary (N − 1)
Security boundary (actual)
Security boundary (N − 1)
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Fig. 7. Determining the power reserves of the actual operating point with
respect to the maximum power injection of the corresponding N − 1 OP
The first step in determining the available power reserve
is to calculate the phase angle corresponding to the security
margin of the N − 1 OP utilizing (13). Then the respective
curve of constant phase angle (blue dashed curve in Fig. 7)
can be computed with (16).
Because of the preventive action the voltage magnitude of
the N − 1 OP may change, but the voltage magnitude at the
actual OP is assumed to remain constant. Consequently, the
curve of constant voltage magnitude can be used to determine
the available power reserve. The curve of constant voltage
magnitude at the actual OP (red dotted curve in Fig. 7) is
computed employing (15). Then this curve is transferred to the
N − 1 OP by adding jXd (blue dotted curve). The injection
impedance that respects the security margin of the N − 1 OP
can be found as the intersection of the blue dotted and blue
dashed circle. This impedance is transferred back to the actual
OP and the available power reserve can be computed.
G. Determination of redispatch solutions
The preventive action comprises the power reduction at a
particular generator to restore its stability (see Sec. III-E)
and the increase of power generation of one generator or a
group to counterbalance the power reduction. Depending on
the determined power reserves of the remaining generators
(see Sec. III-F), a variety of redispatch solutions can be
identified employing different criteria for generator selection
and for sharing of the required power increase between several
generators. Possible generator selection criteria can be size of
the individual power reserve, power margin, electrical distance
to the generator in distress or consensus in served loads.
Criteria for computing a share size for a particular supporting
generator may be determined e.g. by the size of the generator
or its available power reserve.
In the implementation presented in this paper, the generator
or the group of generators to counter balance the power
reduction are chosen corresponding to there relative electrical
distance to the generator in distress. The idea is to redispatch
the reduced power to the electrically close generators. For that
purpose indices representing the relative electrical distance
are computed with an approach based on the one described
in Sec. II-C and [16]. The approach allows to determine the
relative electrical distance of an internal machine node behind
the synchronous reactance to an terminal of another machine.
In order to utilize the method, the extended and augmented
grid admittance matrix was assembled as follows.
Y =
(
N ×N N ×M








where N is the number of buses and M the number of
generators in the system. The matrix is augmented by the load
admittances and the synchronous reactances of the generator.
Furthermore, it is extended to the internal nodes of the genera-
tors. The N×N sub-matrixYnn is the regular grid admittance
of the power system augmented by the load admittance and
the synchronous reactances of the generators. The M × M
matrix Ygg is the sub-matrix containing all the entries due to
the additional internal nodes, which were included due to the
chosen representation of synchronous machines. The N ×M
matrixYng is a sub-matrix, which is linking the internal nodes
of the generators to the system buses corresponding to the
generator terminals, and YTng is its transpose.
After dividing the grid matrix into the sub-matrices accord-
ing to [16], the relative electrical distance of the internal nodes
to the remaining nodes in the system can be calculated as
follows.
[Rng] = 1− abs[Fng] = 1− abs([Ynn]−1[YTng]) (19)
The values in each column of the resulting matrix now contain
a measure of the relative electrical distance between an internal
node of the respective generator to its own terminal, to the
terminals of the other generators and the remaining system
nodes. Each entry has an offset due to the electrical distance
between internal node and terminal, which can be corrected by
subtracting the respective relative electrical distance between
internal node and generator terminal from all the remaining
entries in the particular column.
In the case that the total available power reserves are not
sufficient to perform the required redispatch, an emergency
solution is proposed, which aims at moving the OP of the
critical generator as far as possible away from the stability
boundary and towards the security boundary without jeopar-
dizing stability and security of the remaining generators. For
that purpose, the power reserves of the non-critical generators
are computed as described in Sec. III-F and the total reserve
∆Pres,total as the sum of all reserves is computed, where NC





As stated before, in this case the total reserves are less than
the needed power reduction computed in Sec. III-E. However,
in order to stabilize the critical generator, its power injection
is reduced by ∆Pres,total, which can be counterbalanced by
the remaining generators without putting them at risk.
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of OEL of G1
Fig. 9. IEEE 14-bus: Instability scenario: Generator bus voltages
IV. RESULTS
A. Scenario 1: N-1 OP crosses stability boundary
1) Test System: A modified version of the IEEE 14-bus
test system [17] was used. Modifications of the original system
were amongst others the following. The three condensers in the
system were replaced by generators to allow an active power
redispatch. Bus 8 was considered to be an infinite bus and
the generator connected to it represents a strong external grid.
The synchronous machines G2-G4 are manually excited. The
generators G1 and G5 are equipped with automatic voltage
regulator (AVR), over excitation limiter (OEL) and power
system stabilizer (PSS). A one-line diagram of the test system
can be found in Fig. 8.
2) Unstable scenario: In this scenario the system was
highly loaded and in stressed conditions. To provoke insta-
bility, a sequence of contingencies were applied (see Fig. 9).
The results of the time domain simulation were used to
generate synthetic PMU measurements, which were fed to
the assessment method. After the first and second disturbance,
each corresponding to a loss of a transmission line, the system
seems to reach a new quasi steady state (see Fig. 9). However,
at the new OP the excitation voltage of G1 is too high and the
OEL is activated after a pre-set delay. This last disturbance
led to a loss of synchronism of the respective generator and,
furthermore, to a collapse in voltage in the system.
The stability assessment results, when applying the ASS-
RAS method [5], are shown in Fig. 10. The figure shows a
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 II : t = 25.07
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Fig. 10. IEEE 14-bus: Stability assessment results: Pre-fault (1.08 s), after
first disturbance loss of line 1-2 (25.07 s), after second disturbance loss of
line 4-5 (41.16 s), after third disturbance activation of OXL of G1 (80.06 s).
Arabic numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g. “1” refers to G1.
magnified detail of the normalized injection impedance plane.
Here, the actual OP of a generator is depicted by a blue
circle and the N − 1 OP is indicated by a blue filled square.
The colour of the large circle, which represents the stability
boundary, indicates the stability state of the system, where
green corresponds to a stable state and red to an unstable
state. The state is assessed to be insecure if an OP has crossed
the security margin or a N − 1 OP has crossed the stability
boundary, but the OEL is not yet activated.
Figure 10 shows the stability assessment results at four time
instances labelled with the Roman numerals I-IV. In the pre-
fault condition (see Fig. 10 I) the system is in steady-state.
The first disturbance leads to a considerable reduction of the
stability margin of the actual OPs of G2 and G3 and the
N − 1 OP of G1, but the system remains stable and secure
(see Fig. 10 II). After the second disturbance and when a new
quasi steady state is reached, the method identifies that the
N−1 OP of G1 crossed the stability boundary (see Fig. 10 III).
However, as long as the OEL of the generator is not activated
the system remains stable, but is no longer considered secure.
Consequently, the third disturbance, which corresponds to the
activation of the OEL of G1, leads to an unstable state and,
eventually, to a collapse in voltage (see Fig. 10 IV and Fig. 9).
The results show that the assessment method could detect
an insecure operation of the system approximately 40 s before
the actual collapse in voltage occurred.
3) Scenario with remedial action: In the following the
same instability scenario is discussed, but this time, when
insecure operation is detected, then the remedial action method
described in Sec. III is triggered and a power redispatch is
determined and executed to bring the system back into a secure
state. Offline simulation of the test system showed, that for an
N − 1 OP, the security and trigger margin can be chosen low
with 0.5 % and 0.1 % of Pˆinj .
The stability margin of the N−1 OP of G1 had fallen below
the trigger margin and the system reached a quasi steady state
(see Sec. III-B) at the time instance shown in Fig. 10 III.
Consequently, the remedial action method was executed and a
redispatch as shown in Table II was determined. It should be
noted, that generator G5 was not considered for the redispatch,
8TABLE II
ACTIVE POWER RESERVES AND RE-DISPATCH SOLUTION
Generator: 1 2 3 4
∆Preserve [MW ]: − 9.7 9.7 4.9
Pbefore [MW ]: 179.8 64.9 64.9 20.0
Size [MVA]: 200.0 75.0 75.0 25.0
Pˆinj in [MW ]: 179.5 76.3 80.9 33.3
∆PREM [MW ]: −22.4 9.0 9.0 4.4
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(b) Stabilized scenario: Generator power injection with preventive actions
Fig. 11. IEEE 14-bus: Results of the instable scenario, when applying the
remedial action method
since it represents the connection to a strong external grid.
The method determined that the active power of G1 needs to
be reduced by 22.4 MW to bring the system back into a secure
state. The computation of the power reserves of the remaining
generators showed that only all three generators together can
balance the needed power reduction. The contribution of each
generator was determined from the size of its power reserve
with respect to the available total power reserve. Table II shows
the complete redispatch solution and that in this case the size
of the machine rather than the maximum power injection was
the limiting factor. Figure 11 shows the simulation results,
when the proposed redispatch of active power is applied.
Figure 11a shows the voltages at the generator buses over
time and Fig. 11b shows the active power injection of the
generators. In both graphs, the simulation results without
corrective actions are illustrated with dashed lines and the
results with the proposed redispatch with solid lines.
It can be seen that the collapse in voltage was prevented, due
to the power redispatch, where the power output of G1 was
reduced and the power injections of G2-G4 were increased. An
additional benefit was the prevention of the third disturbance,




























   0.52%
III
V




















 III  : t = 41.16





Fig. 12. IEEE 14-bus: Stability condition before and after preventive action,
the percentages indicate the stability margin after the preventive action. The
Arabic numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g. “1” refers to G1.
which was the activation of the OEL of G1.
Figure 12 shows the stability condition of the system at the
time when insecure operation was detected (see Fig. 10 III and
Fig. 12 III) and when a new quasi steady state was reached
after the corrective redispatch ( Fig. 12 V). The labels at the
OPs show the stability margin of the corresponding generator.
The stability margins of the generators G2-G4 were reduced
considerably and the stability margin of the N − 1 OP of G1
was increased to a secure margin (≥ 0.5 %). Finally, the graph
shows that all generators are secure and stable.
B. Scenario 2: Actual OP crosses stability boundary
1) Test System: The Nordic32 system [18] was chosen for
the second test case. The system topology was modified as
described in [5]. Moreover, in the presented case the initial
condition from [18] were altered. The modifications are as
follows: 1) Generator G22 is set out-of-service and its load is
shared by G7, G8, G20 and G21. 2) Generator G7 is manually
excited. 3) One line connecting 2031 and 2032 is disconnected.
4) Load alternations: at 41 increased by 20 MW, at 2031
increased by 10 MW and at 2032 decreased by 10 MW.
In the presented case, the system is in a very stressed
condition, where the excitation voltage of various generators
is close to the respective limit.
2) Unstable scenario: In order to provoke instability and a
collapse in voltage, the line connecting bus 4021 and 4042 was
tripped at t = 5 s. The disturbance leads to electromechanical
oscillations, which damp out, but lead to activation of various
OELs before a collapse in voltage can be observed (see
Fig. 13). The OELs are activated successively beginning with
G11 at 18.28 s, G4 at 23.70 s, G13 at 33.11 s, G10 at 42.15 s,
G12 at 45.90 s and G6 at 47.13 s.
The ASSRAS assessment results are shown at a selection
of time instances I-IV in Fig. 14. Here only the start and end
OPs (I and IV) are depicted by big markers, which indicate
the type of the OP, while the intermediate OPs at II and III
are solely represented by small blue dots.
In the pre-fault condition seen in Fig. 14 I all the generators
are stable and secure. It can be observed that the most critical
generator is the manually excited generator G7 since its actual
OP is relatively close to the stability boundary with a margin
of 5.73 %. The remaining displayed OPs are N − 1 OPs and,

















Fig. 13. Voltage magnitude at a selection of buses








































































 I  : t = 2.57
 II : t = 18.06
 III: t = 21.89
 IV: t = 45.89
Fig. 14. Nordic32: Stability assessment results: Pre-fault (2.5 s), after
first disturbance loss of line 4021-4042 (18.06 s), after second disturbance
activation of OEL of G11 (21.89 s), G7 crosses stability boundary (45.89 s).
Arabic numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g. “1” refers to G1.
consequently, are less critical. However, these will become
the actual OPs, when the OEL of the respective generator is
activated. The loss of the transmission line connecting bus
4021 and 4042 reduced the stability margin of G7 to 3.68 %
(II) and its OP moved closer to the boundary. Afterwards,
the OEL of G11 was activated at 18.28 s and, hence, the
prior N − 1 OP G11 now became the actual OP. This second
disturbance led to a further reduction of the stability margin
of the critical machine G7 to 0.98 % (III). The subsequent
activations of the OEL’s of G4, G10 and G13 caused further
depression of the stability margin of G7 and the generator
eventually crossed the stability boundary at 44.98 s, as shown
in Fig. 14 IV. Afterwards, the generator started to drift away
from the remaining generators, which eventually causes a
collapse of the voltages at ≈ 73 s (see Fig. 13).
The results show that the assessment method detects the
imminent instability approximately 28 s before the collapse.
3) Scenario with remedial action: In this section, the same
instability scenario as prior is investigated, but this time the
remedial action method is executed, when a generator’s stabil-
ity margin falls below the trigger margin. Offline simulation of
the test system showed, that the margin thresholds for actual
OPs has to be chosen more conservative with 2 % for the
security margin and 1 % for the trigger margin.
In the prior described scenario, the stability margin of
generator G7 fell below the trigger margin at 21.89 s (see
Fig. 14 III). The developed method determined the necessary
remedial action to bring the system back into a secure state
TABLE III
ACTIVE POWER RE-DISPATCH SOLUTIONS
Time Critical Margin Necessary Supp. Margin
s Gen. %∆Pinj ∆P Gen. after red.
21.89 G7 0.98% 8.25 MW G11 1.53%
27.05 G7 0.81% 9.44 MW G11 1.05%
49.46 G7 0.83% 9.09 MW G11 2.14%













































Fig. 15. Stability condition ca. 30 s after the last corrective redispatch. The
Arabic numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g. “1” refers to G1.
to be an active power reduction of G7 by 8.25 MW. Further-
more, the method computed the available power reserves of
the remaining generators. G11 was chosen to counterbalance
the power reduction with an equal increase, because of its
electrical proximity and its sufficient power reserve. Due to the
OEL activation of G4, the margin of G7 again fell below the
trigger threshold, which in return executed the remedial action
method and caused a second corrective power redispatch. The
plurality of OEL activations caused G7 to cross the threshold
a third time. Details on the three corrective actions can be
found in Table III.
The table shows the time, when a corrective action is ap-
plied, the critical generator, whose power injection is reduced,
as well as its stability margin and the needed power reduction.
Furthermore, it shows the supporting generator, which will
counterbalance the power reduction, and the stability margin
of the critical generator after the corrective action. During the
first two corrective actions, the system is in a state, where
ULTC transformers and OELs are acting. Consequently, the
assumption of quasi steady state conditions introduces an error
and may explain, why the remedial action do not lead to a
stability margin greater or equal to the chosen security margin.
The last corrective redispatch succeeds to bring the system
back into a secure state. Figure 15 depicts the system after the
last redispatch and after a new quasi steady state was reached.
It can be seen that all OPs are in the secure and stable region.
Figure 16 displays the voltage magnitudes at a selection
of buses over time. The dashed lines are the voltages in
the unstable case and the solid lines are the voltages in the
case with corrective control actions. The graph shows that the
corrective actions prevented the system collapse and led to a
stabilization of the voltages.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper a new patented method was presented that































Fig. 16. Voltage magnitude at a selection of buses with corrective redispatch
ASSRAS assessment method is used to identify insecure or
unstable system operation. The presented method utilizes these
information to compute corrective power redispatch solutions.
The method is based on algebraically derived expressions,
which makes it very well suited for real-time application. The
control actions move the OP of the critical generator back into
the secure region, while ensuring that none of the supporting
generators enters an insecure state.
The method’s capability of avoiding a collapse in voltage
and an imminent blackout was demonstrated with simulation
results from two scenarios and two test systems (IEEE 14-bus
and Nordic32). In both cases, the determined corrective redis-
patches stabilized the system and restored the stability margin
of the critical machine to a secure level. This demonstrates
accuracy and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.
In future work, the proposed approach could be further
developed, e.g. taking into account additional constraints, such
as the limits of the OELs, when determining the available
active power reserves.
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